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Abstract 
This paper examines three independent explanatory variables and their relation with cost 
overrun in order to decide whether this is different for Dutch infrastructure projects compared 
to worldwide findings. The three independent variables are project type (road, rail, and fixed 
link projects), project size (measured in terms of estimated costs) and the length of the project 
implementation phase. For Dutch projects, average cost overrun is 10.6% for rail, 18.6% for 
roads and 21.7% for fixed links. For project size, small Dutch projects have the largest 
average percentage cost overruns but in terms of total overrun, large projects have a larger 
share. The length of the implementation phase and especially the length of the pre-
construction phase are important determinants of cost overruns in the Netherlands. With each 
additional year of pre-construction, percentage cost overrun increases by five percentage 
points. In contrast, the length of the construction phase has hardly any influence on cost 
overruns. This is an important contribution to current knowledge about cost overruns, because 
the period in which projects are most prone to cost overruns is narrowed down considerably, 
at least in the Netherlands. This means that period can be focused on to determine the causes 
and cures of overruns. 
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Introduction  
Time and again, even during implementation, prevailing cost increases come to light in large-
scale transport infrastructure projects. By the time of opening, the calculated cost overruns are 
enormous. That these cost overruns are a severe problem has been shown in previous studies 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a, 2003b; Merewitz, 1973; Pickrell, 1992; Odeck, 2004; Nijkamp and 
Ubbels, 1999). 
From a first study on the cost performance of Dutch projects, it was concluded that the 
frequency and magnitude of cost overruns is considerably smaller than that found in other 
studies (Cantarelli et al., forthcoming). Differences between the results of studies can usually 
be ascribed to one of the following explanations. First, the difference in use of nominal and 
real prices (Flyvbjerg, 2007). Second, the way in which data is handled; different base for 
estimated and actual cost (see for a more elaborative description Flyvbjerg et al., 2003b). 
Third, sample size could be an explanation and fourth the difference in geographical area of 
project type that is covered.  
The Dutch study has followed as much as possible the international research by Flyvbjerg 
et al. (2003a), it is highly unlikely that differences between both studies can therefore be 
ascribed to the first three reasons for different cost performance. We conclude that cost 
overruns in the Netherlands are different from that in other countries, and hence geography 
matters. To explain the difference in more detail, this research will investigate the 
determinants for cost overruns in Dutch projects.  
Of the various determinants of cost overruns that could be considered in this respect, we 
will consider the following three in this paper: i.e. project type, project size and the 
implementation phase. These determinants have been addressed in previous studies into cost 
overruns and seem to be the most important in understanding cost overruns. Some first 
expectations about these variables are described below.  
Cost performance usually differs between project types, with typically the largest cost 
overruns incurred for rail projects and more reserved overruns for road projects (Flyvbjerg, 
2003b; Merewitz; 1973, Morris, 1990) (with the exception of the findings in the study by the 
Auditor General of Sweden, found in Odeck, 2004). A larger share of road projects could 
explain the smaller average cost overrun in Dutch projects (assuming project type matters).  
Much less consensus exists with respect to the impact of project size. We define project 
size, in line with standard convention, in terms of estimated costs. Odeck (2004) reported that 
“cost overruns appear to be more predominant among smaller projects as compared to larger 
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ones”, whereas Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) found that “…the risk of cost escalation is high for all 
project sizes…”.  
Compared to project type and project size, the length of the implementation phase is to a 
lesser extent addressed in previous studies but it turns out to be an essential predictor of cost 
overruns. According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) it is even more vital than project type: “If 
information on implementation duration is given, project type is not important”. Projects with 
longer implementation phases have larger cost overruns. If Dutch projects would have shorter 
implementation phases, this may explain why in the Netherlands cost overruns are relatively 
small. 
To summarise, this paper aims to investigate whether project type, project size and the 
implementation phase are also relevant for the variance in cost overruns in the Netherlands 
and whether these variables can explain the differences in cost performance between Dutch 
projects and those found in other studies.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 will describe the data 
collecion and methodology. After that, the relation between each of the three determinants on 
cost overruns is described in sections 3 to 5. Section 6 draws the main conclusions and 
discussions and finally section 7 describes areas for further research.  
 
Data Collection and Methodology1 
Data Collection  
All large-scale transport infrastructure projects in the Netherlands, defined as projects that 
cost more than 20 million Euros (2010 prices) that were completed after the year 1980 were 
selected. Projects completed before this year are excluded because the data were expected to 
be difficult to come by. Data were collected from a variety of sources, amongst others 
interviews with former project leaders and project teams; archives research at the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment; RWS2 Direction Large Projects and RWS Direction Zuid-
Holland; internet search; and the MIRT reports. The MIRT (Meerjarenprogramma 
Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport, translated as the Multi-year programme for 
infrastructure, spatial planning and transport3) is the implementation programme related to the 
policy of ‘mobility and water’ and includes all infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. A 
total of 161 transport infrastructure projects were selected (road, rail, tunnels and bridges), 
however, because of reasons of limited data availability or invalidity of the data, 83 projects 
could not be included in the database The final database therefore consists of 78 projects.  
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The resulting database does not include all projects due to incompleteness of information. 
However, in line with previous international research in this field that also includes projects 
based on data availability, the database is considered to be a sample. In this research also non-
significant differences will be reported because we are also interested in a complete 
description of the project performance of the specific projects in the database. 
The database is considered representative for the population of road and rail projects, but 
some bias is expected regarding cost overruns for tunnels and bridges. For these projects, data 
was partly based on interviews, which holds the risks that more favourable data is given. The 
cost overruns for fixed link projects may therefore be underestimated.   
 
Methodology  
The two most important data variables in this research are the estimated and actual costs. Cost 
overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs minus estimated costs expressed as a percentage 
of the estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real, accounted construction costs 
determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted or 
forecasted construction costs determined at the Time of formal Decision to build (ToD). This 
is also called the "decision date”, "the time of the decision to proceed," the "go-decision" 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). At that moment, cost estimates were often available as data for 
decision-makers to make an informed decision.  
By means of statistical analyses we will investigate whether the three determinants have 
any relation with cost overrun and how this relation can be described.  
In line with Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) we define the implementation phase as the period from 
the year of the formal decision to build (ToD) until the construction is completed and 
operations have begun. Data about the year in which operations have begun (here referred to 
as the actual opening year) is therefore required. However, for projects that were based on the 
MIRT documentation, data on this actual opening year were unavailable and an assumption 
had to be applied. For projects for which the year of opening is indicated in the MIRT, the 
assumption was established by comparing the year of opening with the last year in which 
costs were provided in the MIRT. It turned out that, on average, the actual opening year was 
one year (road projects) or one and a half years (rail projects) before the last year for which 
costs were indicated in the MIRT. Resulting from these findings we assume that the actual 
opening year for road projects is one year and for rail projects one and a half years before the 
last year for which costs were indicated in the MIRT. These assumptions are considered fairly 
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reasonable since the MIRT is prepared one year before it is published (MIRT of 2004 is set up 
in September 2003).  
The implementation phase is split into two phases: the pre-construction phase and the 
construction phase. The pre-construction phase is the period between the ToD and the start of 
construction. The construction phase is the period between the start of construction and the 
year in which the project is completed and operation has begun. The cost overrun in the 
preparation phase is measured as the estimated costs at the start of construction minus the 
estimated costs at the ToD expressed as a percentage of the estimated costs at the ToD. The 
cost overrun in the construction phase is measured as the actual out-turn costs minus the 
estimated costs at the start of construction expressed as a percentage of the estimated costs at 
the start of the construction. For the analyses regarding these two phases, similar to the study 
in the companion paper (Cantarelli et al., forthcoming) only projects that consist of a 
preparation and construction phase are included.  
 
Cost Overruns per Project Type 
For each project type this section presents information on cost overruns including the average 
cost overrun and the frequency with which cost overruns occur in general, and by two 
different project phases specifically (the pre-construction and the construction phase).  
 
Characteristics of Cost Overruns per Project Type 
Table 1 gives an overview of the average cost overruns for each project type.   
Table 1 Average cost overrun per project type 
Project Type N Mean CO % SD 
Road 37 18.6 38.9 
Rail  26 10.6 32.2 
Fixed links 15 21.7 54.5 
Bridges 7 6.5 33.3 
Tunnels 8 35.0 67.4 
Total 78 16.5 40.0 
 
Fixed link projects have the largest average cost overrun of 21.7%, followed by road projects 
with 18.6% and rail projects with 10.6% (F=0.458, p=0.634). Subdividing fixed links into 
bridges and tunnels, we find that tunnels appear to be considerably more prone to cost 
overruns than bridges though the difference is not significant (F=1.021, p=0.331) – note that 
the numbers are low. It should be noted that the presence of lock-in is highly likely and hence 
these cost overruns are underestimated (see Cantarelli et al. forthcoming for an elaboration of 
the increase of the average cost overrun due to lock-in).  
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A possible explanation for the low average cost overrun for rail projects is the type of 
construction. It is possible that the rail projects included in this research are mostly 
expansions of existing railway lines e.g. broadenings (from two tracks to four tracks), 
improvements or adjustments, rather than new infrastructure constructions. These types of 
constructions usually involve smaller cost overruns than new infrastructure. For the Dutch 
data the average cost overrun for the projects (road, rail, fixed links) that concerned 
expansions of existing infrastructure was indeed 9.2% lower (SD=34.0) than the average of 
20.9% (SD=42.9) for the projects concerned with the construction of new infrastructure 
(t=1.256, p=0.213, independent sample t-test). This does not only apply for all projects 
together but also for road and rail projects separately. However, the share of projects which 
expand existing infrastructure in rail projects is not higher than for road projects. The type of 
construction cannot therefore explain the difference in average cost overrun between these 
project types. Organisational set-up and institutional settings may account for the difference 
between the project types – ProRail is project owner for rail projects and RWS for road 
projects. 
The relatively low cost overruns of Dutch rail projects compared to worldwide rail projects 
may be explained by the type of rail projects. Dutch rail projects mainly concern heavy rail 
whereas the worldwide research also concerns light rail, a type of rail that typically involves 
much higher cost overruns.  
As the number of tunnel and bridge projects is considerably smaller compared to the 
number of road or rail projects and since analyses based on a small number of projects are 
much more vulnerable to extreme scores, tunnels and bridges are taken as one category called 
fixed links in the remainder of this paper. The subdivision will thus be based on three project 
types: road, rail and fixed link projects.  
 
Table 2 presents the frequency by which cost underruns (left side) and cost overruns (right 
side) occur.  
 
Table 2 Number of projects with cost underrun and overrun (in percentage and number) and their averages 
Number of projects with 
cost underrun 
Number of projects with 
cost overrun 
Project 
type 
(%) (#) (%) (#) 
Mean Cost 
underrun % 
(SD) 
Mean Cost 
overrun  
% (SD) 
Road 37.8 14 62.2 23 14.3 (12.7) 38.7 (35.6) 
Rail  50.0 13 50.0 13 13.1 (8.8) 34.2 (29.4) 
Fixed links 53.3 8 46.7 7 14.4 (10.1) 62.9 (55.5) 
Total 44.9 35 55.1 43 13.9 (10.5) 41.3 (38.1) 
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For road projects, more projects have cost overruns (62%) than cost underruns (38%) 
(p=0.188 respectively, binomial test). Furthermore, the magnitude of overruns (the mean 
overrun is 39%) is also higher than that of the magnitude of underruns (14%) (p=0.009). For 
rail and fixed link projects, the frequency of overruns is equal to or smaller than the frequency 
of underruns. However, for both rail and fixed projects, again, the magnitudes of overruns are 
higher than that the magnitudes of underruns (p=0.006 and p=0.011 respectively). The 
average cost underrun is similar between project types (p=0.948, Anova) but the average 
overrun is twice as large for fixed link projects compared to road and rail projects (p=0.249). 
Remarkably, fixed links have the lowest frequency of cost overruns, but the average cost 
overrun is largest.  
 
Cost Overruns in the Pre-Construction and Construction Phase 
The main problem with cost overruns lies in the pre-construction phase but this does not 
necessarily mean that this also applies for each project type2.  
Table 3 indicates the cost overruns in the pre-construction and in the construction phase for 
each project type specifically. It presents the frequency by which cost underruns and cost 
overruns occur and the respective average underrun and overrun. In the following we will 
focus on the results for road and rail projects and not on fixed link projects because the 
number of fixed link projects is too small to make any statements.  
 
Table 3 Average cost underrun and overrun in the pre-construction and construction phase per project typeb 
 Pre-construction phase Construction phase Project 
Type N Mean SD # projects 
underrun- 
overrun 
%  
underrun-
overrun 
Mean SD # projects 
underrun-
overrun 
%  
underrun-
overrun 
Road 23 17.6 33.5 5-18 12 - 26 -2.9 15.2 12-11 14 - 9 
Rail  11 21.5 33.1 5-6 2 - 41 -6.9 14.2 9-2 12 - 16 
b In which CU= cost underrun and CO=cost overrun and #=number of  
 
Considering the pre-construction phase, the main findings are as follows: 
! The average cost overrun is smallest for road projects and largest for rail projects 
(p=0.098, F=0.756, One way Anova).  
! Cost overruns are more common than cost underruns for both road and rail projects 
(p=0.011 and p=1.000 for road and rail respectively, binominal test).  
! For projects with cost underruns, rail projects have the largest underrun (12%; 
F=2.246, p=0.172, One way Anova). For projects with cost overruns, rail projects 
                                                
2 Note that actual cost overruns can only take place once the project is completed and payments are made, but for simplicity we stick with this 
term. 
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have the largest average cost overrun (41%), followed by road projects (26%) 
(F=0.936, p=0.344, One way Anova).  
 
Considering the construction phase, the main findings are as follows: 
! On average, road and rail projects involve cost underruns of 3% and 7% respectively. 
(F=0.545, p=0.466, One-way Anova).    
! Cost underruns are more common than cost overruns (p>0.05 for both road and rail, 
binominal tests).  
! For projects with cost overruns, rail projects have the largest average cost overrun 
(F=1.581, p=0.235, One way Anova). For projects with cost underruns, road projects 
have the largest underrun (F=0.117, p=0.736, One way Anova).  
 
To summarise, in the pre-construction phase most road and rail projects had cost overruns and 
in the construction phase most projects had cost underruns. The average cost overrun in the 
pre-construction phase is significantly higher than the average cost underrun in the 
construction phase (p=0.011 and p=0.034 for road and rail projects respectively, Paired-
sample T-test). It appears that the cost performances in both phases are of a different nature. 
Moreover the project types perform differently in both phases. Though we did not investigate 
the mechanisms involved, we assume that before the construction starts, projects tend to get 
more expensive to correct for optimism at the decision to build, or because of additional costs 
due to additional measures taken to reduce the impact on the environment. Once the 
construction phase has started, cost overruns are less common and a lot of projects are built 
for the costs as estimated at the start of the construction phase. Obviously large cost overruns 
in this phase due to strategic behaviour (having resulted in too low cost estimates at the 
moment the construction starts) or due to unforeseen (or at least not considered) technical 
problems are less common.      
 
 
Project Size 
Project size will be examined in this study in two ways; as an ordinal and scale variable. First 
of all, projects are often categorised as small, medium, large or very large projects and then 
the differences in the average percentage cost overrun between these groups of projects is 
determined. Secondly, as a scale variable, the influence of project size on the extent of the 
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cost overruns is examined. These two subjects will be addressed in sections 4.1 and 4.2 
respectively.  
Two projects were considered statistical outliers and are excluded from the analyses. Both 
projects had estimated costs of more than € 4000 million whereas the average project size for 
the other projects was €147 million (SD=168) (2010 prices). These projects are the 
Betuweroute and HSL-South, two recently implemented rail projects that are also different 
from the other projects in the database in terms of their length (160 km and 125 km 
respectively, compared to the average length of the other projects of 5 km).  
 
Cost Overruns for Small, Medium, Large and Very Large Projects 
Small, medium, large and very large projects were defined by the cost limits that were used in 
the MIRT of €112.5 and €225 million. The MIRT (Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, 
Ruimte en Transport, translated as the Multi-year programme for infrastructure, spatial 
planning and transport2) is the implementation programme related to the policy of ‘mobility 
and water’, and is part of the budget of the infrastructure fund of the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment. These two cost limits result in 3 categories with the category including 
the smallest projects representing almost 75% of all projects. Because of its high share we 
split this category into two groups by introducing a third cost limit of €50 million (again half 
the cost of the first limit of €112.5 million). The distribution of the projects regarding project 
size is then as follows: 
! Small < €50 million: 24 
! Medium €50 - <€112.5 million: 22 
! Large €112.5 - <€225 million: 13 
! Very large > €225 million: 17 
Table 4 presents the statistics on cost overruns broken down by project size and project type. 
The statistics include the number of projects, the percentage of projects, the average 
percentage overrun and standard deviation and the net total overrun in percentages. The net 
total overrun is the overrun in million euros expressed as a percentage of the total overrun in 
million euros.  
Table 4 Cost overruns broken down by project size (estimated costs in € in 2010)c 
Project size Number of 
projects 
Percentage of 
projects 
Mean cost 
overrun (%) 
Standard 
deviation 
% of cost 
overrun 
Small 24 31.6 18.5 40.5 6.3 
Medium 22 28.9 23.2 53.2 35.0 
Large 13 17.1 7.0 29.3 9.0 
Very Large 17 22.4 10.9 26.7 49.7 
c In which:, % of cost overrun = the net total overrun as a percentage for the specific category .  
 11 
The number of projects in each category is rather evenly distributed amongst the categories 
with slightly more projects in the small and medium groups and slightly less projects in the 
large and very large groups. Considering the average overrun, small and medium projects 
have the largest average cost overrun (F=0.565, p=0.640, univariate analysis of variance). 
Possible differences between the four groups in average cost overruns could be caused by the 
way in which the formation of the groups was based on the cost limits of the MIRT. If, 
however, groups were based on an equal number of projects per group and hence different 
cost limits for each group, it is still the “small projects” that have the largest average 
percentage cost overrun with 26% (F=0.666, p=0.576, univariate analysis of variance). 
With respect to the net total overrun, very large projects account for the largest overrun; 
almost half of the total overrun (in amount of overrun) follows from very large projects.  
 
Project Size as a Predictor for Cost Overruns 
A linear or logarithmic relation between project size and cost overruns is often assumed in 
literature. The logarithmic relationship provided a slightly better fit for the Dutch data, but 
since the logarithmic coefficient for the model was not statistically significant (p=0.132), we 
preferred the simpler, linear model.  
Figure 1 shows the plot of percentage cost overruns against project size including the 
regression line for all projects (solid line) as well as the regression lines for the three project 
types separately (dotted lines). 
 
 
Figure 1 Estimated costs and cost overruns for 76 projects 
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The regression line for cost overrun (%) for all project types is: , where C0 is 
the estimated costs of the project (€ in 1995) Cost overruns decrease with project size; for 
each additional million Euros that a project costs, the cost overruns decrease by 0.05% (t=-
1.083, p=0.282, R2=0.016). Considering the small scope and the low explained variance, we 
conclude that cost overruns weakly depend on project size. 
One fixed link project with considerably higher estimated costs (€ 1006 million) compared 
to the average (€ 199 million for fixed links project (SD=190)) could be considered a 
statistical outlier. However, excluding the project from analyses hardly alters the results 
(slope=-0.036, t=-1.041, p=0.301, R2=0.015).  
Considering all the projects together there is no significant relation between project size 
and the level of cost overruns. However, from figure 1 it can be seen that, especially for fixed 
link projects, there is a tendency towards smaller cost overruns for larger projects. The 
relation between the project size and cost overruns was therefore also tested for each project 
type individually. It turns out that for road and fixed link projects, the same conclusion holds 
as for all projects; cost overruns decrease with project size. In contrast, for rail projects, cost 
overruns increase with project size but the effect is negligible (0.001%). 
 
Implementation Phase 
A previous study on cost overruns during project development showed that the main cost 
overruns occur in the pre-construction phase rather than in the construction phase. This 
section will therefore also consider the lengths of the pre-construction and construction phase 
separately as indicators for cost overruns. Note that actual cost overruns can only take place 
once the project is completed and payments are made, but for simplicity we stick with this 
term. 
 
Cost Overruns for Different Lengths of the Implementation Phase  
Fixed link projects have the largest average length of the implementation phase (9.2 years, 
SD=3.2) followed by road projects (7.3 years, SD=3.1) and rail projects (6.5 years, SD=2.3). 
The length of the implementation phase is statistically different between the three project 
types (p=0.017). Since fixed link projects also had the largest average cost overrun and rail 
projects the smallest, we expect a positive relationship between the length of the 
implementation phase and cost overruns. This was tested in more detail by a regression 
analysis. Literature assumed either a linear (Flyvbjerg et al. 2004) or quadratic relationship 
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(Odeck, 2004) and both were tested for the Dutch data (there is no reason to assume any other 
types of non-linear relationships). Although the quadratic relationship resulted in a slightly 
better fit the coefficient of the quadratic component was not statistically significant (p=0.139) 
and we therefore preferred the linear relationship.  
Figure 2 gives a plot of the cost overrun against the length of the implementation phase for 
all projects (solid line) and for road, rail and fixed link projects specifically (dotted lines).  
 
 
Figure 2 Length of the implementation phase and cost overruns for 78 projects 
 
The regression line for all projects is: , where C is the cost overrun (as a % 
of constant prices) and T is the length of the implementation phase of the project. For each 
additional year of the implementation phase, cost overruns increase by 3.74% (t=2.533, 
p=0.013). The explained variance of cost overruns by implementation phase is, however, low 
(R2 =0.078). For each project type individually, cost overruns also increase with the length of 
the implementation phase (p<0.05 for road and rail, p=0.036 for fixed link projects).  
 
The implementation phase possibly includes delays. Delay is, at least in the Netherlands, 
often assumed to be a main predictor of cost overruns. As a delay results in a longer 
implementation phase and cost overruns increase with each additional year of the 
implementation phase, it is expected that delays would also influence cost overruns. The 
average length of the implementation phase for projects with delays is indeed larger (7.7 
years) than the average length for projects that were completed on time (6.5 years, t=-1.449, 
p=0.151, independent sample t-test). The average cost overrun for projects with delays is also 
larger (18.5% compared to 10.0%) but the difference is not statistically significant (t=-0.787, 
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p=0.434, independent sample t-test). With a coefficient that is similar to that of the variable 
length of the implementation phase (3.55, t=1.119, p=0.168) and a lower explained variance 
of 0.021, it is not the delay but the length of the implementation phase that is the better 
predictor of cost overruns.  
  
Cost Overruns for Different Lengths of the Pre-Construction and Construction Phase  
The average length of the pre-construction phase is 3.0 years (SD=2.2) which is significantly 
shorter than the average length of the construction phase (4.8 years, SD=2.6, t=-3.364, 
p=0.001, paired sample t-test).  
Considering the larger cost overruns in the pre-construction phase compared to the cost 
overruns in the construction phase, it is expected that the length of the pre-construction phase 
is more strongly related to cost overruns than the length of the construction phase.  
 
Fixed link projects have the largest pre-construction phase (an average of 3.7 years, SD=2.6), 
followed by road projects (3.4 years, SD=2.2) and rail projects (1.4 years, SD=0.8, p=0.009). 
Fixed links also have the largest average cost overruns and we therefore assume a positive 
relationship between the length of the pre-construction phase and the cost overrun. By means 
of a regression analysis, this relation can be further examined. Again it was tested for linear 
and quadratic relationships. The quadratic model has a similar fit to the linear model but since 
the coefficient of the model is not statistically significant (t=-0.319, p=0.751) the linear model 
is preferred.  
The regression formula is: , where C is the cost overrun (as a % of 
constant prices) and T is the length of the pre-construction phase of the project. The pre-
construction phase is responsible for 10.2% of the variance in cost overruns. For each 
additional year the pre-construction phase takes, the cost overrun increases by 5.0% (t=2.365, 
p=0.022).  
For road, rail and fixed links, there is also a positive relation between the length of the pre-
construction phase and cost overruns, with varying degrees of impacts. The extent by which 
cost overruns increase with each additional year of the pre-construction phase is much larger 
for rail projects than for road and fixed link projects.  
 
Rail projects have the largest construction phase, with an average of 5.6 years (SD=2.3) 
followed by fixed link projects (4.9 years, SD=2.6) and road projects (4.3 years, SD=2.6) 
(p=0.305, Anova). Similar to the lengths of the implementation and pre-construction phase, 
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the relation between the length of the construction phase and cost overruns is considered by 
means of a regression analysis. The data was also tested for a quadratic relationship but this 
did not result in a better model fit. The regression formula is: , where C is the 
cost overrun (as a % of constant prices) and T is the length of the construction phase of the 
project. For each additional year of construction, the extent of the cost overrun decreases by 
0.15% (t=-0.075, p=0.940). Beside this small coefficient, the small explained variance in cost 
overruns (R2=0.000) shows that cost overruns are only to a very small extent dependent on the 
length of the construction phase. The influence of the construction phase on cost overruns is 
also small for each project type individually. Two projects were identified as statistical 
outliers, having a construction phase of more than 10 years. Although the relation between 
length of the construction phase and cost overruns changes into a positive one, the difference 
is only 1% and not statistically significant (p=0.733). 
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
Conclusions  
This study addressed the influence of the project type, project size and the length of the 
implementation phase on cost overruns for Dutch projects.  
 
First, the main findings regarding the project type are as follows: 
! Rail projects perform better compared with road and fixed link projects. 
! Road projects are particularly vulnerable to cost overruns. 
! For all project types, cost overruns mainly appear in the pre-construction phase. 
Considering these findings it can be concluded that also regarding project type, the cost 
performance in the Netherlands differs from those worldwide. Rail projects have the largest 
average cost overrun worldwide, whereas in the Netherlands this is the category with the 
smallest average overrun. In addition to the lower average cost overrun, the frequency of cost 
overruns for all project types is considerably lower compared to worldwide findings.  
 
Secondly, for project size the following conclusions can be drawn: 
! The problem of cost overruns is most severe for small projects. 
! Project size does not significantly influence the cost overrun. 
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In average percentages, cost overruns are highest for small projects, but the impact of project 
size on cost overruns is small. However, in terms of net total overrun in percentages, larger 
projects contribute to a greater extent to cost overruns.  
 
Thirdly, regarding the implementation phase, the main findings are as follows: 
! The longer the implementation phase the higher the cost overruns, especially for fixed 
link projects. 
! The pre-construction phase is significantly shorter than the construction phase but it 
has the highest influence on cost overruns.  
The length of the pre-construction phase has a strong (positive) relation and the length of the 
construction phase has a weak (negative) relation with cost overruns. This makes the length of 
the pre-construction phase a much better determinant of cost overruns than the length of the 
construction phase. It is even a better predictor than the length of the implementation phase. 
The same applies for the individual project types, except for fixed link projects. We therefore 
conclude that the focus should lie on the pre-construction phase when searching for causes 
and cures for cost overruns, at least for the Netherlands.  
 
Discussion  
The findings raise several points for discussion. This section will address these subjects 
focussing on the possible reasons that can explain the findings.  
The study showed that in the Netherlands cost overruns for rail projects are relatively low, 
both when compared nationally with roads and fixed links and internationally when compared 
with worldwide findings. The difference between project types may be related to the 
organisational set-up and institutional settings which is different for rail projects (with ProRail 
as project owner) and for road projects (with RWS as project owner).  
The type of construction, i.e. either new construction or the broadening of an existing 
structure, does not explain the difference between road and rail projects in the Netherlands, 
but it could explain the difference with the worldwide findings. In the Dutch data, a large 
share of projects concerns broadenings, adjustments, improvements and not new 
infrastructure. New infrastructure typically involves larger cost overruns and the international 
database may include a greater number of new infrastructures, which could explain the 
difference. Furthermore, the type of rail, heavy or light rail, could explain the difference with 
the worldwide findings.  
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This research furthermore concluded that small projects have the largest average cost 
overrun. Odeck (2004) suggests that this could be due to the greater amount of attention that 
is given to larger projects. “Larger projects are most probably under much better management 
as compared to smaller ones”. This suggests that smaller projects deserve more attention than 
is currently the case as they result in similar cost overruns as the large projects. Of course the 
benefits should exceed the additional management costs. In addition, the length of the pre-
construction phase turns out to be a better predictor of cost overruns than the length of the 
construction phase or implementation phase. The causality is still uncertain, so it is as yet 
impossible to conclude that shortening this period will reduce the magnitude of cost overruns. 
In addition, a shorter phase might not be sufficient to obtain agreement on the project 
implementation. This would have to be discussed in the construction phase and hence, cost 
increases might not be reduced but shifted to the next phase. More insight into the reasons 
behind the cost increase in this phase is needed to determine the effect of shortening the 
length of the pre-construction phase.  It is questioned whether a shorter pre-construction phase 
fits with the decision-making culture in the Netherlands. This culture is characterised by many 
opportunities for the general public, as well as the local citizens, interest groups and industry 
to participate in the process. The belief is that this will, eventually, result in greater support 
for the project’s plans, therefore avoiding resistance in later phases of the decision-making 
process. Depending upon the level of participation in this pre-construction phase, reducing the 
phase might complicate the possibilities for participation and not necessarily result in smaller 
cost overruns.  Shortening this phase may even result in larger cost overruns because 
possibilities for participation are reduced that may have corrected the cost estimate. 
Considering the three main explanations for cost overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) – 
technical, psychological and political-economic explanations – the latter seems the most 
likely. Technical explanations concern forecasting errors in technical terms such as inaccurate 
models (Ascher, 1978; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a; Morris & Hough, 1987; Wachs, 1990). 
Psychological explanations are based on the cognitive mind of forecasters resulting in 
optimistic forecasts. According to this explanation, promoters and forecasters are held to be 
overly optimistic about project outcomes in the appraisal phase, when projects are planned 
and decided (Fouracre et al., 1990; Mackie & Preston, 1998; Walmsley & Pickett, 1992; 
World Bank, 1994 in Flyvbjerg et al., 2002), and political-economic explanations are based 
on strategic misrepresentation (Wachs, 1989).  The forecasting models or optimism bias do 
not change with the length of the pre-construction phase and hence cannot explain the 
increasing cost overruns. Conversely, strategic misrepresentation can increase cost overruns. 
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In the pre-construction phase, strategic misrepresentation can be seen by the many scope 
changes. Before the decision to build, the estimated costs were purposefully kept low (usually 
with a small project scope) to increase the chances for the proposal being accepted. Once 
accepted, attempts are made to add scope to the project, resulting in large cost increases. The 
longer the pre-construction period will take, the more opportunities there are to adjust the 
project plans (either due to unforeseen events or purposefully) and hence raise the project 
costs and eventually cost overruns. Shortening this phase will however only result in lower 
cost overruns when the possibility of purposeful scope changes and similar behaviour is 
eliminated.  
 
Areas for Further Research  
The findings of this research pose several areas for further research. First of all, most 
importantly, it is interesting to examine the reasons behind the findings that are presented in 
this research. We suggest hereto various in-depth interviews with persons that were involved 
in the different projects. Particular attention can be paid to the pre-construction phase, why 
the costs increased to such a large extent and how reducing the length of the phase would 
affect the cost development. Further, it would be interesting to disaggregate the cost overruns 
in different types of costs. Data availability did not allow to make such a distinction in the 
current research and additional data collection is therefore necessary. Secondly, it would be 
interesting to compare the cost performance between countries. Thirdly, cost overruns could 
be considered from the perspective of the decision-making culture or more specifically, the 
system of governance. It is expected that the way in which decisions are made will influence 
the cost performance of projects. A first possible distinction could be democratic versus non-
democratic systems of governance but other distinctions may also be suitable. We will 
explore these subjects, the comparison between countries and systems of governance in 
subsequent papers. 
This paper concludes by proposing three additional areas of further research. First of all, 
the relation between the different phases in the decision-making phase and the extent of the 
cost overruns could be considered and compared between countries. This would provide an 
answer to the question of whether the length of the pre-construction phase is also a better 
indicator of the total cost overruns in other countries. For this, the specific decision-making 
phases for each country should be taken into account, because it probably varies. Secondly, it 
might be useful to consider several projects in more detail, to determine specifically the 
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reasons for each cost increase. Lastly, as type of construction (new infrastructure or not) may 
make a difference to cost performance, additional research into this variable is recommended. 
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Notes 
1. For a full description of the project selection, data collection and methodology we refer to 
Cantarelli et al. (forthcoming) which is a companion paper to the present paper. The full 
methodological elucidation will be included in a PhD Thesis (2011), of which this paper 
makes up a part. 
2. The translation of the MIRT in English is based on:  
http://www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl/english/topics/water/delta_programme/rules_and_fra
mework_of_the_mirt (consulted 20-03-2010) 
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